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I.

INTRODUCTION

When the Minnesota Constitution was signed in 1857, there is
little doubt that the creators anticipated the government would
1
2
need the power of eminent domain to further the public good.
† J.D. Candidate, William Mitchell College of Law, 2007; B.A., English and
Political Science, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 2002.
1. “Eminent domain” is “[t]he inherent power of a governmental entity to
take privately owned property, esp. land, and convert it to public use, subject to
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Today, many cities engage in urban renewal projects that require
3
them to utilize the power of eminent domain to take properties
4
and use them in a way that will revitalize communities. However,
this is a long and arduous process that sometimes takes years and
5
can ultimately be abandoned. The property owners who are told
that their property would be taken can be left with reduced values
6
due to the condemnation process. If the property is not then
7
condemned, have they suffered a de facto taking?
The courts have most often answered this question in the
negative, with the notable exception of Johnson v. City of
8
Minneapolis. Before Johnson, most courts were only willing to admit
9
that a taking could be possible under those circumstances. Johnson
marked the first case where the Minnesota Supreme Court found
that a de facto taking occurred based on a city’s actions prior to
10
condemnation without actually condemning the property.
This Case Note first describes the history of takings cases, most
11
of which deal with urban renewal projects. It then recounts the
12
facts and decision in Johnson v. City of Minneapolis.
Next, it
reasonable compensation for the taking.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 562 (8th ed.
2004).
2. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13.
3. “A taking . . . is defined by statute to include every interference with the
ownership, possession, enjoyment, or value of private property.” 18 DUNNELL
MINN. DIGEST, EMINENT DOMAIN, § 5.00 (5th ed. 2005). The statute is intended to
“give effect to the constitutional requirement that private property shall not be
taken, destroyed, or damaged for public use without just compensation being first
paid or secured.” Id.
4. Urban renewal projects have been consistently recognized as a proper
excuse to use the power of eminent domain. 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 78
(2006). Urban redevelopment is used to improve areas that are “deteriorated,
deteriorating, substandard, or detrimental to the safety, health, morals or welfare
of the community.” Id. (citing Aposporos v. Urban Redev. Comm’n of Stamford,
790 A.2d 1167, 1172 (Conn. 2002)). This is an approved public use under the
U.S. Constitution. Id.
5. 27 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 505 (2005).
6. See Johnson v. City of Minneapolis, 667 N.W.2d 109, 110 (Minn. 2003).
7. A “De facto taking” is an “[i]nterference with the use or value or
marketability of land in anticipation of condemnation, depriving the owner of
reasonable use and thereby triggering the obligation to pay just compensation.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1493 (8th ed. 2004).
8. Johnson, 667 N.W.2d at 116.
9. See, e.g., Foster v. Herley, 330 F.2d 87, 91 (6th Cir. 1964); Orfield v. Hous.
& Redev. Auth. of St. Paul, 305 Minn. 336, 341, 232 N.W.2d 923, 927 (1975); City
of Buffalo v. J. W. Clement Co., 269 N.E.2d 895, 902 (N.Y. 1971).
10. Johnson, 667 N.W.2d at 116.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part III.
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analyzes the departure from previous law that the court
demonstrated, balancing the rights of property owners with the
13
power of eminent domain. Finally, it concludes that while the
decision is limited, it shows that the Minnesota Supreme Court is
14
unwilling to allow cities to abuse their power of eminent domain.
II. HISTORY
The power of eminent domain is a right of the State under the
15
Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The government can
effect a taking in three ways: straight condemnation, legislative
16
taking, or inverse condemnation.
Straight condemnation and
legislative taking are different from inverse condemnation in that
17
they are condemnation proceedings initiated by the government.
18
Inverse condemnation is initiated by the affected property owners.
A. The Penn Central Analysis
19

Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, cited in
Johnson, is heavily relied on in cases concerning inverse
condemnation because it sets out a standard to evaluate when a
20
taking has actually occurred.
The property involved in Penn
Central was Grand Central Terminal (“Terminal”) in New York
21
City. New York City had afforded the Terminal landmark status in
22
1967. In an effort to increase income, Penn Central entered into
a lease with UGP Properties, Inc., who planned to construct office

13. See infra Part IV.
14. See infra Part V.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
16. Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 3-5 (1984).
17. Id. In a straight condemnation proceeding, an officer of the government
initiates proceedings in order to purchase the property from the property owner.
Id. at 3-4. Just compensation is determined by a jury, judge, or special
commission. Id. at 4. A legislative taking occurs when Congress enacts a statute
appropriating the land. Id. at 5. Just compensation is determined after the fact.
Id.
18. “Inverse condemnation” is “[a]n action brought by a property owner for
compensation from a governmental entity that has taken the owner’s property
without bringing formal condemnation proceedings.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
310 (8th ed. 2004).
19. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
20. Id. at 124.
21. Id. at 115.
22. Id. at 116.
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23

space on the Terminal.
Two designs were drawn up and submitted to the Commission
24
for approval. One design proposed that the office space sit above
the Terminal, while the other design had the office space next to
25
and part of the Terminal. Due to the Terminal’s landmark status,
26
neither design was approved. Penn Central sued New York City
on the theory that “the Landmarks Preservation Law had ‘taken’
27
their property without just compensation.”
Penn Central advanced the notion that “the airspace above the
Terminal is a valuable property interest,” arguing that depriving
28
the use of air rights is a taking.
The Supreme Court did not
accept this argument because “the submission that . . . [Penn
Central] may establish a ‘taking’ simply by showing that they have
been denied the ability to exploit a property interest that they
heretofore had believed was available for development is quite
29
simply untenable.” The Court stated that it looks at the parcel as
30
a whole, not as pieces of property rights.
Penn Central also advanced the theory that the Landmarks
Law “significantly diminished the value of the Terminal site” and
31
singled out owners of landmark property. However, the Court
rejected “the proposition that diminution in property value,
32
standing alone, can establish a ‘taking.’” As to the Landmarks
Law arbitrarily singling out properties, the Court pointed out that
33
there were over 400 landmarks designated in New York City. In
addition, Penn Central had the opportunity to present the
Commission’s decision for judicial review to determine if the
34
designation of landmark status was arbitrary.
23. Id.
24. Id. These designs were called Breuer I and Breuer II Revised because
they were designed by architect Marcel Breuer. Id. at 116-17.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 117-18. Penn Central declined to submit any more designs, nor did
it seek judicial review of the Commission’s decision to deny the application for
Breuer I and Breuer II Revised. Id. at 118. In fact, though opposed to it, Penn
Central did not seek judicial review of the Terminal’s designation as a landmark in
the first place. Id. at 116.
27. Id. at 119.
28. Id. at 130.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 131.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 132.
34. Id. at 133. The Court pointed out, somewhat irritably, that “there is no
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The Court next examined whether “interference” with the
property was such that eminent domain proceedings, including
35
compensation, were appropriate. The Court observed that the
36
Landmarks Law did not interfere with the Terminal’s present use.
In fact, it allowed the Terminal to continue to be used as it had
37
been for sixty-five years and operate with a “reasonable return.”
Also, the Court observed that the Landmarks Law did not expressly
prohibit the use of the airspace above the Terminal, only that it not
38
be used for fifty-story office buildings. Based on these findings,
the Court concluded that the Landmarks Law did not effect a
39
taking of Penn Central’s property. Instead, the loss of property
40
rights was minimal.
B. Other Persuasive Development of Eminent Domain Law
1.

Foster Decision
41

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Foster v. Herley started
the trend toward recognizing that a taking could exist in situations
42
where the condemnation process had not been completed. The
City of Detroit called the affected property owners to City Hall to
43
inform them that their property would be taken.
They also
instructed the property owners that they should not make any
44
improvements. In addition, the City of Detroit placed a notice of
basis whatsoever for a conclusion that courts will have any greater difficulty
identifying arbitrary or discriminatory action in the context of landmark
regulation than in the context of classic zoning or indeed in any other context.”
Id.
35. Id. at 136.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 136-37. The original structure included columns to support a
twenty-story office tower that could be located above the terminal. Id. at 115 n.15.
The Commission did not deny that it would approve the originally planned twentystory office building, but again, Penn Central declined to submit any more designs
utilizing the air space above the terminal. Id. at 137 n.34.
39. Id. at 138. “The restrictions imposed are substantially related to the
promotion of the general welfare and not only permit reasonable beneficial use of
the landmark site but also afford appellants opportunities further to enhance not
only the Terminal site proper but also other properties.” Id.
40. Id. at 136-37.
41. 330 F.2d 87 (6th Cir. 1964).
42. Id. at 89-91.
43. Id. at 88.
44. Id.
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45

lis pendens on the property and passed a resolution stating that no
new buildings could be erected or improvements made on the
46
property.
These restrictions remained on the property for ten years until
the City of Detroit finally decided to abandon the condemnation
47
proceedings and lift them. At that point, the property had fallen
48
into grave disrepair. To add insult to injury, the City of Detroit
then required that the property owner demolish the buildings at
his own expense because they were in such a state of
49
deterioration.
Shortly thereafter, the City of Detroit reinstituted the
condemnation proceedings and proposed to compensate the
property owner at the value of the property in its demolished
condition instead of the value before the condemnation
50
proceedings began. It was then that the property owner instituted
51
an action against the City of Detroit.
The property owner made a Due Process claim under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, but the Michigan
52
District Court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
The
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Michigan District Court
and ruled that federal jurisdiction existed based on the assumption
53
that the lower court could rule that a taking occurred. While the
court of appeals declined to rule on whether the situation actually
54
qualified as a de facto taking, Foster opened the door to the
45. A notice of lis pendens is a “notice, recorded in the chain of title to real
property, required or permitted in some jurisdictions to warn all persons that
certain property is the subject matter of litigation, and that any interests acquired
during the pendency of the suit are subject to its outcome.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 950 (8th ed. 2004).
46. Foster, 330 F.2d at 88.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 88-89.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 89.
53. Id. at 91 (emphasis added).
At the present time it appears to be settled that it is not enough that
the plaintiff seeks to enforce a right which has its origin in the
Constitution or a law of the United States, but that it must be shown by
the complaint that the right will be supported if the Constitution or law
is given one construction and will be defeated if given a different
construction.
Id.
54. Id. at 90.
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possibility that a landowner could claim a taking based on a city’s
actions during condemnation proceedings without actually passing
55
title of the property to the government.
2.

Clement Decision

Following the Foster decision, in City of Buffalo v. J. W. Clement
56
Co., the New York Court of Appeals dealt with the issue of whether
57
a taking could occur absent a physical invasion of the property. In
Clement, the plaintiff J. W. Clement Co. (“Clement”), a printing
company, was forced to relocate to a new facility because of
58
condemnation proceedings against its property.
The
condemnation process took many years, leaving the property worth
much less than when the company was first informed of the
59
planned condemnation.
Ultimately, the court decided against finding a de facto
60
taking.
The court reasoned that it was necessary to have “an
61
assertion of dominion and control” to constitute a taking. Aside
from delay, there was only “a manifestation of an intent to
62
condemn,” which is not enough to prove a taking. However, it
did not discount the possibility that precondemnation activities
63
could rise to the level of exercising control over the property.
A strong policy decision also existed for not granting a taking
64
based on these facts. Due to growth, Clement planned to relocate
65
to a new facility within the next four or five years. While it is true
that the condemnation proceedings caused Clement to relocate
earlier than planned, the court could not ignore the fact that
condemnation was not the only reason Clement relocated to a new
66
facility.
55. See Sayre v. City of Cleveland, 493 F.2d 64, 69 (6th Cir. 1974).
56. 269 N.E.2d 895 (N.Y. 1971).
57. Id. at 899.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 900.
60. Id. at 904.
61. Id. at 903.
62. Id. “It is important to note that the city never, by its statements or actions,
directly or indirectly, interfered or sought to exercise any control over the
property, thus inferentially depriving the claimant of its possession, enjoyment, or
use.” Id. at 905.
63. Id. at 904.
64. Id. at 901.
65. Id. at 900.
66. Id. at 901. “[T]o expand the current concept of De facto taking on the
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C. Minnesota Cases
1.

Orfield Decision
67

When Orfield v. Housing & Redevelopment Authority of St. Paul, a
case heavily relied upon in the Johnson decision, was decided,
Minnesota courts had not yet addressed the specific issue of
whether precondemnation activity could be considered a taking
68
under the Minnesota Constitution. The City of St. Paul applied
for federal funds to initiate a redevelopment project in the Summit69
University Urban Renewal Area. The City of St. Paul surveyed the
area and determined the properties that were most in need of
70
funds.
The City of St. Paul classified Orfield’s property as
71
substandard, but it was not at the top of the list for condemnation.
They repeatedly urged Orfield to keep his property in good
72
condition and never told him it would be condemned. Orfield
argued that the property declined as a result of the condemnation
73
proceedings around his property, but the record clearly showed
that the renewal project was borne out of the area’s decline, not
74
the other way around.
The Minnesota Supreme Court followed the rulings from
75
other jurisdictions in holding that there was not a taking.
However, the reasoning was slightly different. Instead of the
assertion of control test, the court held that “economic loss caused
by the altered character of a neighborhood due to normal activities
in connection with an urban renewal project, without more, does
facts herein may well be to allow all property owners to seek refuge under the
broader umbrella of De facto appropriation as soon as the proposed
condemnation is announced, irrespective of their underlying motivation.” Id.
67. 305 Minn. 336, 232 N.W.2d 923 (1975).
68. See Fitger Brewing Co. v. State, 416 N.W.2d 200, 205-06 (Minn. Ct. App.
1987).
69. Orfield, 305 Minn. at 337, 232 N.W.2d at 925.
70. Id. at 337, 232 N.W.2d at 924.
71. Id. at 337, 232 N.W.2d at 925.
72. Id. at 338-39, 232 N.W.2d at 925.
73. Id. at 339, 232 N.W.2d at 926.
74. Id. at 341, 232 N.W.2d at 927.
75. Id. at 341, 232 N.W.2d at 927 (citing Sayre v. City of Cleveland, 493 F.2d
64, 69 (6th Cir. 1974); City of Buffalo v. J. W. Clement Co., 269 N.E.2d 895, 902
(N.Y. 1971)) (reinforcing the rule that properties adjacent to those slated for
condemnation do not have a cause of action against the condemning authority
because of decline in market values).
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not constitute a de facto taking of the property in a constitutional
76
sense.” To have a de facto taking, the court required an abuse of
eminent domain power that is “specifically directed against a
77
particular parcel.” While the court did not find that to be the case
78
in Orfield, the ruling ultimately prepared the way for the court to
decide Johnson.
2.

Fitger Decision

Where Orfield was a clearer case against the property owners,
79
Fitger Brewing Co. v. State was less so. Over several years, the City of
Duluth contemplated an expansion of Interstate 35 and, in 1969,
the new planned route included the land where the Fitger Brewing
80
Company (“Fitger”) was located.
Around the same time, the
Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (“MPCA”) notified Fitger that
it would need to install new pollution control devices in order to
81
stay in operation.
Over the next couple years, Fitger went back and forth with
the MPCA and the City of Duluth in deciding whether to close the
82
plant or make the improvements required by the MPCA. With the
help of the City of Duluth, Fitger received extensions on the
deadline to complete the improvements, but the MPCA set its final
83
deadline at September 30, 1972.
At that time, the City of Duluth still had not yet made a
decision about which plan would be used for the Interstate 35
expansion project, however, Fitger was informed that all the plans
84
under consideration included the use of its land. Fitger requested
and received a letter stating that fact as well as a statement that “it
would be impractical . . . to install pollution abatement facilities in
85
view of the planning currently in process.”
Unfortunately for Fitger, the letter also included a statement
that there was a possibility the Fitger property would not be taken,
which was an important part of the Minnesota Court of Appeals’
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 341, 232 N.W.2d at 927.
Id.
Id.
416 N.W.2d 200 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
Fitger, 416 N.W.2d at 201-02.
Id. at 202.
Id. at 202-03.
Id. at 203.
Id.
Id.
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86

decision to rule against the brewery.
Comparing the letter
received in Orfield to the letter received in Fitger, the court
concluded that the Fitger letter, like the Orfield letter, made it clear
87
to Fitger that its property might not be taken.
The court of
appeals saw no reason to find the de facto taking that the Orfield
88
court had suggested was possible.
The court also argued that there was no abuse of eminent
domain power because Fitger’s “choice of action was not controlled
89
or restrained by the state.” This assessment seemed to focus more
on the significant control test suggested in earlier cases than the
new Orfield standard that indicated a court may find abuse when
90
actions are taken against a specific parcel of land.
Fitger
petitioned for a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court, but
91
the Supreme Court denied the request.
III. THE JOHNSON DECISION
A. Facts and Procedural History
In 1983, the City of Minneapolis approved a redevelopment
plan for the southern portion of Nicollet Mall that targeted an area
92
The winning bid for the
spanning three-and-one-half blocks.
project was submitted by a French development corporation, La
Societe Generale Immobiliere (“LSGI”), with whom the City of
Minneapolis executed a contract in 1986 which required LSGI to
acquire anchor tenants and the City of Minneapolis to acquire the

86. Id. The letter stated:
In addition, we must advise you that there is a possibility that I-35 may
not be extended beyond Mesaba Avenue; the possibility of some other
alignment of which we are unaware of at this time, other proposals
from our consultants or other consultants, or the public, which may
eliminate the necessity of taking the Fitger Brewing Company property.
Id. at 203-04.
87. Id. at 208.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See City of Buffalo v. J. W. Clement Co., 269 N.E.2d 895, 904 (N.Y. 1971)
(holding that the mere announcement of impending condemnation without a
corresponding substantial impairment of the claimant’s right to use or enjoy the
property does not constitute a compensable taking).
91. Fitger Brewing Co. v. Minnesota, 416 N.W.2d 200 (1987), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 819 (1988).
92. Johnson v. City of Minneapolis, 667 N.W.2d 109, 111 (Minn. 2003).
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93

property through eminent domain. LSGI was also required to
submit confidential progress reports to the City of Minneapolis,
and the City of Minneapolis reserved the right to approve designs
94
submitted by LSGI.
The City of Minneapolis rejected LSGI’s first design, which
proposed a dome over the street for pedestrians and a tunnel
95
underneath for traffic. At that time, LSGI had begun negotiating
with department stores Nordstrom and Neiman Marcus as potential
96
anchor tenants.
The City of Minneapolis entered into a postclosing agreement with LSGI that allowed LSGI to continue
negotiating with potential anchor tenants and begin work on a new
97
design. The agreement also included the City of Minneapolis’
obligation to acquire the property once a design had been
98
approved and to lease that property to LSGI for ninety-nine years.
Shortly thereafter, the mayor of Minneapolis, who was against
the redevelopment plan, wrote to Nordstrom and Neiman Marcus
99
and urged them not to go through with the deal. These letters
damaged LSGI’s ability to secure Nordstrom and Neiman Marcus
100
as anchor tenants.
Despite this setback in the development project, the City of
Minneapolis sent letters to the owners of the properties that were
slated for redevelopment (“Owners”) informing them that the City
101
of Minneapolis was planning to go through with the project. The
properties would need to be appraised because they “would be
102
acquired if the development takes place.”
The City of
Minneapolis included in the letters that appraising the property
was not a definite commitment to buy it; however, it did not inform
the tenants at any point thereafter that their properties would not

93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 111-12.
96. Id. at 112.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. The mayor was opposed to the redevelopment plan from the start. Id.
at 111. The original contract with LSGI was over the mayor’s veto. Id. When the
mayor wrote to the two proposed anchor tenants, Nordstrom and Neiman Marcus,
he “suggested that LSGI had not been honest with” them. Id. at 112.
100. Id. According to the district court’s findings, the letters “had a
detrimental effect on LSGI’s ability to secure the prospective anchor tenants.” Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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103

be taken. This made it very difficult for the Owners to make full
use of their property because existing and potential tenants were
104
wary of moving into property that was going to be condemned.
At this point, despite LSGI’s continued attempts to secure
Neiman Marcus as an anchor tenant for this project, the City of
Minneapolis started talking to Neiman Marcus about getting
105
involved in another project at the north end of Nicollet Mall. In
addition, LSGI submitted another design, which was vetoed by the
106
mayor. The City of Minneapolis issued a public notice of default
because LSGI had not yet secured any anchor tenants, even though
107
its failure was due in part to the City of Minneapolis’s actions.
A third design proposal was submitted and approved by the
108
Minneapolis Community Development Agency (“MCDA”).
The
109
Mayor vetoed the design, but the MCDA overrode his veto.
However, in order to get the approval of the City Council, the City
of Minneapolis required LSGI to make substantial changes to the
110
design.
Ultimately, the relationship deteriorated to the point
where the City of Minneapolis terminated its contract with LSGI
and reallocated the funds meant for this project to the project on
111
the north end of Nicollet Mall with Neiman Marcus.
LSGI sued the City of Minneapolis for specific performance in
112
June 1989 and filed a notice of lis pendens on all the properties
113
The Minnesota Federal District Court
slated for redevelopment.
found for LSGI, but the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
114
overturned the ruling. The notice of lis pendens was not removed
115
until after the trial was over in 1993.
The Owners sued the City of Minneapolis under a cause of
action for inverse condemnation, claiming a de facto taking under

103. Id.
104. Id. at 113.
105. Johnson v. City of Minneapolis, 649 N.W.2d 873, 877 (Minn. Ct. App.
2002).
106. Johnson, 667 N.W.2d at 113.
107. Id.
108. Johnson, 649 N.W.2d at 877.
109. Id.
110. Johnson, 667 N.W.2d at 113.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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116

both the U.S. Constitution and Minnesota Constitution.
The
district court ruled that the Owners had suffered a taking under
117
118
both constitutions.
It made several findings that led it to
conclude that “the City’s activities . . . created a ‘cloud of
condemnation’ over the properties,” reduced fair market values,
119
and impaired property use “for an unreasonable period of time.”
Also, the court found that “the City had abused its eminent domain
120
power and acted in bad faith with respect to [the Owners].”
121
The court of appeals reversed the district court decision.
122
Relying on Kirby Forest Industries v. United States, the court of
123
“It is not enough
appeals applied the “significant control” test.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
The district court and the advisory jury found that the City had: (1)
identified a specific geographic footprint that included [the Owner’s]
properties; (2) in honoring the commitment to confidentiality, refused
to provide information about the project to property owners; (3) not
clearly communicated to [the Owners] that acquisition of their
properties might not occur and that they should maintain their
properties to avoid loss of value in case their properties were not
acquired; and (4) not informed [the Owners] that the City had
terminated the contract and negotiations with LSGI.
Id.
119. Id. at 113-14.
120. Id. at 114.
121. Johnson v. City of Minneapolis, 649 N.W.2d 873, 875 (Minn. Ct. App.
2002).
122. 467 U.S. 1 (1984).
123. Johnson, 649 N.W.2d at 884. Kirby Forest concerned Congressional
legislation that created a large national park that included land owned by Kirby
Forest. Kirby Forest Indus., 467 U.S. at 7. Kirby Forest argued for compensation
from the time condemnation proceedings began instead of when the government
tendered payment for the property. Id. at 13. They claimed that they were
“deprived of all of the significant interests associated with ownership” because the
condemnation proceedings had the “effect of preventing the owner of
unimproved land thereafter from making any profitable use of it, or of selling it to
another private party.” Id. While conceding that type of control was severe
enough to warrant a taking, the Supreme Court did not find the argument to be
representative of the situation. Id. at 14-15. “Until title passed to the United
States, [Kirby Forest] was free to make whatever use it pleased of its property.” Id.
at 15. The Government “never forbade [Kirby Forest] to cut the trees on the land
or to develop the tract in some other way.” Id. “Indeed, [Kirby Forest] is unable
to point to any statutory provision that would have authorized the Government to
restrict [Kirby Forest’s] usage of the property prior to payment of the award.” Id.
Also interesting to note is a footnote in which the court mentioned testimony
offered at trial suggesting that Kirby Forest would not have acted any differently
toward the parcel of land had there not been any condemnation proceedings
because it was used as a reserve logging area. Id. at 6 n.8. The Court stated that
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under either Penn Central or Orfield for property owners to show
that the government’s actions substantially impaired the value of
their properties—those actions must also exert significant control
124
over the owners’ use of their properties.”
The court conceded
that the City of Minneapolis acted in bad faith, however, it
concluded that because the property owners knew their property
might not be taken and were allowed to continue using their
property, the City of Minneapolis did not have significant control
125
over the properties.
B. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision
The Minnesota Supreme Court first approached the issue of
126
It
whether there was a taking under the U.S. Constitution.
examined the analysis of the court of appeals and found that the
court of appeals had applied an incorrect test; it should have
127
applied the Penn Central analysis.
However, the supreme court
declined to remand the case to the court of appeals or apply the
128
correct standard itself because it found the analysis irrelevant.
Specifically, the supreme court found the actions by the City of
129
Minneapolis violated the Minnesota Constitution.
The Minnesota Constitution requires “just compensation”
130
Under
whenever private property is taken for public use.
Minnesota law, “[a] taking include[s] every interference, under the
right of eminent domain, with the possession, enjoyment, or value
131
of private property.”
The Johnson court emphasized that a
physical invasion of the property was not necessary to have a taking
of the property, but that economic loss due to normal activities
taken by a city to implement redevelopment plans was not usually
this testimony would not be given weight in the decision, but like other cases
dealing with condemnation proceedings, little facts such as this appear to sway the
courts in one direction or another. See, e.g., Johnson, 667 N.W.2d at 116.
124. Johnson, 649 N.W.2d at 884.
125. Id. at 885.
126. Johnson, 667 N.W.2d at 114-15.
127. Id. at 115. “This test requires the court to consider: (1) the economic
impact of the regulation on the claimant; (2) the extent to which the regulation
has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations; and (3) the character
of the government regulation.” Id. at 114-15 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City
of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
128. Id. at 115.
129. Id.
130. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13.
131. MINN. STAT. § 117.025, subd. 2 (2004).
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132

compensable.
However, an abuse of the power of eminent
domain may be tantamount to regulatory control, constituting a de
facto taking “when that abuse is specifically directed at a particular
133
parcel.”
The court compared the facts of Johnson to Orfield and found
134
Johnson factually distinct in three ways. First, in Orfield the City of
135
The
St. Paul kept the property owner aware of the situation.
Owners in Johnson were not informed at any point that their
136
properties might not be acquired. Second, the property in Orfield
137
In Johnson, the City of Minneapolis
was not specifically targeted.
138
targeted a specific stretch of property along Nicollet Avenue.
139
Third, in Orfield, the City of St. Paul did not act in bad faith. The
City of Minneapolis in Johnson did not use its best efforts to keep
the Owners informed or work with LSGI, resulting in a bad faith
140
effort.
The court concluded that the City of Minneapolis had abused
its power, leaving the Owners in limbo with unmarketable
141
property.
This was a de facto taking. However, the court
qualified its ruling by stating that this was a “narrow and rare
instance,” and cautioned that this ruling would not apply to all
142
owners who become subject to precondemnation activity.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE JOHNSON DECISION
Johnson was the first case in which the Minnesota courts ruled
143
It
that precondemnation activity constituted a de facto taking.
132. Johnson, 667 N.W.2d at 115.
133. Id. (quoting Orfield v. Hous. & Redev. Auth. of St. Paul, 305 Minn. 336,
341, 232 N.W.2d 923, 927 (1975)).
134. Id.
135. Orfield, 305 Minn. at 338-39, 232 N.W.2d at 925.
136. Johnson, 667 N.W.2d at 116.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. The court qualified its finding of bad faith by stating, “[w]hile each
action taken by the City, analyzed separately, could be viewed as normal
condemnation activity, the cumulative effect of the actions rendered [the
Owners’] properties unmarketable for years while the development was being
negotiated and, later, in litigation.” Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. Any one particular action taken by the City in Johnson would not
necessarily be cause for a de facto taking under a different situation. Id. It was the
combination of factors that compelled the court to rule in favor of the Owners. Id.
143. See Orfield v. Hous. & Redev. Auth. of St. Paul, 305 Minn. 336, 341, 232
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144

marks a distinct departure from previous case law.
Significantly,
the court refused to give the decision too much weight when it
refused to examine the merits under the U.S. Constitution and
145
limited the decision to its facts.
Instead, the court interpreted
146
the Minnesota Constitution and possibly opened the door to
147
similar litigation despite its clearly limited scope.
A. Courts Wary of Expanding the Definition of a “Taking”
The general rule is that “mere plotting or planning in
anticipation of a public improvement does not constitute a taking
148
The courts have
or damaging of the property affected.”
compelling reasons for being wary of expanding the definition of a
149
taking to include situations where condemnation was abandoned.
Planning to condemn does not necessarily mean that there is an
invasion of property or an infringement on the use and enjoyment
150
of property.
In many cases, a plan to condemn property that is
151
abandoned will leave the property completely undisturbed.
Also, the courts operate under the assumption that every
property has a threat of condemnation because the government
152
can take property for public use at any time. The courts are likely
loath to undermine that basic principle of property ownership. On
a more practical side, the courts believe that condemnation
proceedings should not be hindered because they “aid [in] the
growth and expansion of municipalities” and any hindrance to that

N.W.2d 923, 927 (1975); see also Foster v. Herley, 330 F.2d 87, 91 (6th Cir. 1964)
(recognizing subject matter jurisdiction for federal court to hear a
precondemnation activity claim); City of Buffalo v. J. W. Clement Co., 269 N.E.2d
895, 902 (N.Y. 1971) (reversing trial court’s finding of a de facto taking).
144. Compare Johnson, 667 N.W.2d at 116 (holding that the property owners
were entitled to compensation for the time their properties were under the threat
of condemnation), with Fitger Brewing Co. v. State, 416 N.W.2d 200, 208 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1987) (concluding that “the landowner’s freedom of choice on
improvements [was] not substantially destroyed by state action”).
145. Johnson, 667 N.W.2d at 116.
146. Id. at 115-16.
147. See Roy Whitehead, Jr. & Lu Hardin, Government Theft: The Taking of Private
Property to Benefit the Favored Few, 15 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 81, 102 (2004).
148. J. R. Kemper, Annotation, Plotting or Planning in Anticipation of Improvement
as Taking or Damaging of Property Affected, 37 A.L.R. 3d 127, § 3 (2004).
149. Id. § 4.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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153

power may slow progress. However, there is a point where a city’s
actions go too far, invading the property and infringing on its use
154
and enjoyment.
B. Fitger Versus Johnson
In Orfield, the supreme court suggested that an abuse of the
power of eminent domain directed at a particular parcel of land
155
would be cause for finding a de facto taking. However, it did not
156
find an abuse in that case, nor did the court of appeals in the
157
But Johnson conclusively demonstrated
subsequent case of Fitger.
a situation in which there was an abuse of power, serving to balance
the rights of property owners with the right of cities to exercise the
158
power of eminent domain.
The hesitancy to open up this issue was clear when the U.S.
Supreme Court declined review of Fitger after the court of appeals
159
seemed to misapply the Orfield standard. The Supreme Court was
likely apprehensive about applying the Orfield standard for all the
reasons mentioned above. While there was a hardship there, and
Fitger was forced to close down, Fitger was still able to operate its
business normally up until the point of closing and was able to sell
160
the land to a developer. Also, the City of Duluth made efforts to
153. Id.
154. See Johnson v. City of Minneapolis, 667 N.W.2d 109, 116 (Minn. 2003).
155. Orfield v. Hous. & Redev. Auth. of St. Paul, 305 Minn. 336, 342, 232
N.W.2d 923, 927 (1975).
156. Id.
157. Fitger Brewing Co. v. State, 416 N.W.2d 200, 208 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
158. Gideon Kanner, Developments in Eminent Domain Law 2003-2004, in
PLANNING, REGULATION, LITIGATION, EMINENT DOMAIN, AND COMPENSATION 179
(ALI-ABA Course of Study, Aug. 26-28, 2004).
159. “We know from Orfield that there is no such abuse if the state makes it
clear to the owners there may be no taking, does not abuse its discretion by
abandoning a plan to take, and urges the owners to make necessary property
improvements.” Fitger, 416 N.W.2d at 208. In a letter from the State Highway
Commissioner, the State recognized the impracticality of making improvements to
the brewery given that it was likely to be condemned, although the State
maintained that it did not promise to take the property. Id. at 203-04. The City of
Duluth knew that Fitger was counting on this letter to make a decision to close the
plant and was even promised the letter on the condition that he not make a big
fuss about the proceedings to the media. Id. at 203. In addition, the City of
Duluth encouraged Fitger to oppose landmark status for the brewery because it
needed the land for the highway. Id. at 204. Despite these facts, the court of
appeals insisted that the City of Duluth did not abuse its discretion. Id. at 208.
160. Id. at 204. The action against the State was instituted in January 1978,
and the property was sold to a private developer in 1983 for $700,000. Id.
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161

work with Fitger and the MPCA.
In the end, the City of Duluth
did not work fast enough to have a final decision when Fitger
162
needed it.
In contrast, the Owners in Johnson suffered a much greater
hardship in terms of the effect of the City of Minneapolis’s actions
163
on their property and the treatment they endured.
The City of
Minneapolis “identified a specific geographic footprint . . . refused
to provide information about the project, [had] not clearly
communicated to [the Owners] that acquisition of their properties
might not occur and that they should maintain their properties,”
and did not inform the Owners that it had terminated the contract
164
with LSGI.
The District Court of Minnesota that originally heard the case
listed findings that supported the conclusion that the City of
Minneapolis had “abused its eminent domain power and acted in
165
bad faith with respect to [the Owners].”
The condemnation
process was dragged out over years, with the Owners losing tenants
and declining property values making it nearly impossible to keep
166
the property running.
This was the same abuse described in
167
The court
Orfield, making it impossible for the court to ignore.
could not have ruled in any other way given the rule set out in
168
169
Orfield. However, the ruling was limited.
161. Id. at 202-03.
162. Id. at 204.
163. See Johnson v. City of Minneapolis, 667 N.W.2d 109, 111-13 (Minn. 2003).
164. Id. at 113.
165. Id. at 114.
From its findings, the district court concluded that: (1) the City’s
activities in connection with the LSGI project created a ‘cloud of
condemnation’ over the properties from at least November 23, 1987
until the LSGI suit was resolved in February 1995; (2) the City’s actions
significantly reduced the fair market value of [the Owners’] properties
and caused a loss of rental income, thereby causing a substantial and
adverse economic impact on the properties and rendering [the
Owners’] businesses commercially impracticable; (3) the City uniquely
burdened [the Owners] by impairing their existing and prospective
uses of the properties for an unreasonable period of time; and (4) the
City interfered with [the Owners’] investment-backed expectations by
disturbing their longstanding and existing uses of the properties.
Id. at 113-14.
166. Id. at 114.
167. Id. at 116.
168. Id.
While each action taken by the City, analyzed separately, could be
viewed as normal condemnation activity, the cumulative effect of the
actions rendered [the Owners’] properties unmarketable for years
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C. Limitations of Johnson
First, the court declined to rule on whether the City of
Minneapolis’s actions constituted a violation of the U.S.
170
Constitution.
It made its findings strictly on the text of the
Minnesota Constitution stating, “[t]aking . . . include[s] every
interference, under the right of eminent domain, with the
171
possession, enjoyment, or value of private property.”
This case
only extends as far as the State of Minnesota and possibly as
persuasive authority for other states that have similar wording in
their constitutions.
The decision states that the reason why the Minnesota
Supreme Court declined to look at the U.S. Constitution was
because it was irrelevant based on the fact that the Owners are
172
entitled to compensation under the Minnesota Constitution.
However, Gideon Kanner suggests that an application of the
173
analysis found in Penn Central would have been incorrect.
The
Penn Central analysis is appropriate where a legitimate regulation
174
goes too far.
Nothing of the sort is true in precondemnation blight
cases. There the government is not regulating. It is then
not promoting the public good, nor engaging in any kind
of legitimate police power regulation (whose objectives
are the promotion of public health, safety, welfare or
morals). Rather, it is then engaging in a self-serving
illegitimate activity whose purpose is not to further the
public condition, but rather to interfere in the real estate
market untainted by government manipulation, in order
while development was being negotiated and, later, in litigation.
Because of the unique circumstances of this case, we find no basis for
reversing the district court’s findings and conclusions of law that the
City specifically targeted [the Owners’] properties and acted in bad
faith and conclude that this case presents a narrow and rare instance in
which precondemnation activity constituted a taking under the
Minnesota Constitution.
Id.
169. See id.
170. Id. at 115.
171. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 117.025, subd. 2 (2004)). This is in contrast to
the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which only promises that no
person shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
172. Johnson, 667 N.W.2d at 115.
173. Kanner, supra note 158, at 179.
174. Id.
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to lower the value of the subject properties and save itself
money when it finally gets around to acquiring the
affected properties by eminent domain ‘on the cheap.’
175
That is not a legitimate government activity.
While the facts in Johnson do not support a contention that the
City of Minneapolis was attempting to lower the property values in
order to take advantage of the decline later, it was definitely a
situation in which the City of Minneapolis was interfering with the
market by misleading the Owners and essentially thwarting its own
176
project.
Second, the court explicitly states, “our decision is limited to
177
the particular facts presented.”
While the case may have finally
demonstrated a situation in which the abuse of power was severe
enough to justify a de facto taking, the court was sure to
178
communicate that this was not a “sweeping” decision.
A
collection of factors convinced the court to rule in favor of the
Owners, factors that, when taken alone, would not have been
179
persuasive.
The court limited its holding to the facts of this decision for
the same reasons that courts are wary of looking at this issue in the
180
first place. As mentioned above, the courts do not want to hinder
government’s fundamental right of eminent domain, or more
181
importantly, its right to abandon condemnation proceedings.
It
is an essential power to continue the growth and progress of
182
cities.
If cities were forced to compensate everyone they considered
for condemnation, they would not be able to afford the utilization
183
of one of their basic functions, taking property for public use.
Despite this danger, the Minnesota Supreme Court still decided to
184
rule against the City of Minneapolis.
This speaks to the
contention that even though this ruling could prove to be a
disturbance to eminent domain law, the court will not allow cities

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id.
Johnson, 667 N.W.2d at 111-13.
Id. at 116.
Id.
Id.
See Kemper, supra note 148, § 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Johnson, 667 N.W.2d at 115.
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185

D. The Effect of the Minnesota Constitution
These concerns beg the question of why the Minnesota
Supreme Court opened this can of worms in its decision in Orfield,
and why it eventually found a taking in Johnson. The answer can
most likely be found in the Minnesota Constitution. Where the
general rule is that plotting and planning cannot be considered a
taking, the court recognized a distinction in the Minnesota
186
Constitution that may include exceptions to that rule.
The language of the Minnesota Constitution is broader than
187
the language of the U.S. Constitution.
The U.S. Constitution
states that “no person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
188
taken for public use, without just compensation.”
However, the
Minnesota Constitution takes it a step further, stating that
“[p]rivate property shall not be taken, destroyed or damaged for
189
public use without just compensation.”
The Johnson court examined the language from the Minnesota
Constitution and other statutory provisions to conclude that “[t]he
clear intent of Minnesota law is to fully compensate its citizens for
losses related to property rights incurred because of state
190
actions.”
Minnesota law provides more protection to property
owners from the State than federal law does, which is why the
Orfield court expanded the definition of a taking under Minnesota
191
law.
E. The Future of Eminent Domain
The effect of the Johnson decision is still largely unknown. It

185. See id.
186. Id.
187. Compare MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13, with U.S. CONST. amend. V.
188. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
189. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13.
190. Johnson, 667 N.W.2d at 115 (citing State by Humphrey v. Strom, 493
N.W.2d 554, 558 (Minn. 1992)). The court also cited a Minnesota statute stating
that “a taking ‘include[s] every interference, under the right of eminent domain,
with the possession, enjoyment, or value of private property.’” Id. (citing MINN.
STAT. § 117.025, subd. 2 (2002)).
191. See Orfield v. Hous. & Redev. Auth. of St. Paul, 305 Minn. 336, 340, 232
N.W.2d 923, 926 (1975).
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192

has only been cited in one case of any significance.
In Concept
Properties v. Minnetrista, the Minnesota Court of Appeals
193
distinguished the facts in Johnson from the facts at hand. Concept
Properties dealt with a land-use policy, not an abuse of the
194
condemnation proceedings.
The plaintiff in Concept Properties urged the court to apply the
Johnson standard, which is more lenient than the arbitration test
195
called for by governing case law on regulatory takings. However,
the court refused to apply the Johnson standard and emphasized
196
that the facts in Johnson were “unique.”
Concept Properties is not
very factually similar to Johnson, so it is unsurprising that the court
197
refused to adopt the Johnson standard.
Nonetheless, the Johnson decision serves as a possible
movement from the long-held tradition to give legislative bodies
“great judicial deference” when it comes to eminent domain
198
proceedings. It could have implications for other issues that arise
199
as a result of eminent domain, though it did not in Concept
200
Properties.
Many jurisdictions are currently dealing with whether

192. See Concept Props., LLP v. Minnetrista, 694 N.W.2d 804, 823-24 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2005).
193. Id.
194. Id. The plaintiff, Concept Properties, owned a parcel of land that was
included in the Metropolitan Urban Services Area (“MUSA”), or “the designated
portion of the metropolitan area in which governmental agencies support urban
development by providing necessary public facilities and services, including sewer
service.” Id. at 810-11. In 1998, the property was no longer considered to be
included in the MUSA. Id. at 811. The property owners purchased the property
in the midst of the city’s revisions of MUSA property and under the impression
that it was included in the MUSA. Id. at 812. Subsequently, Concept Properties
sued the city based on a claim of a regulatory taking because they were no longer
able to develop the land in the way they had planned. Id. at 813. However, while
the property cannot connect to the sewer system, a septic system can be built to
serve the property. Id. at 823. Thus, development is possible, just more difficult.
Id.
195. Id. (“In applying the arbitration standard, we consider whether the
regulation deprives the property of all reasonable uses . . . . If an alternative use is
available, even if it is not the most profitable use, the regulation has not denied
the property all economically beneficial use.”)
196. Id.
197. Compare Johnson v. City of Minneapolis, 667 N.W.2d 109, 111-13 (Minn.
2003) (deciding whether precondemnation proceedings rise to the level of a de
facto taking), with Concept Props., 694 N.W.2d at 810-13 (determining whether a
regulatory action was arbitrary or capricious).
198. Whitehead & Hardin, supra note 147, at 102.
199. See id.
200. Concept Props., 694 N.W.2d at 823-24.
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state and local governments have a legitimate public use for
201
While Johnson does not
property they propose to condemn.
address that particular issue, it provides foundation for case law
opposing overreaching use of eminent domain by the
202
government.
However, the encompassing message of all the cases that
decided whether precondemnation activities rose to the level of a
compensable taking seems to depend on the unique facts of each
203
case.
The court granted relief in Johnson because the facts were
204
There was a real showing of bad faith on
particularly egregious.
the part of the City of Minneapolis and, as a result, the Owners
205
suffered significant damage.
In Fitger, there seemed to be some
bad faith on the part of the City of Duluth, but the loss sustained,
206
while unfortunate, was minimal.
It will take another particularly egregious set of facts to repeat
207
the ruling in Johnson. The most likely outcome of this case is that
cities will keep property owners informed of the status of
condemnation proceedings and continually remind them that
there are no guarantees their property will be taken because, if they
208
do not, the courts may make them answer for it.
201. Whitehead & Hardin, supra note 147, at 81.
202. Id. at 102.
203. Cf. Foster v. Herley, 330 F.2d 87, 88 (6th Cir. 1964) (allowing jurisdiction
under the federal Constitution because a taking could be found where (1) the city
initiated condemnation proceedings, refusing to allow property owners to build
on their land for ten years; (2) then abandoned the condemnation; and (3) later
reinstituted the proceedings and took the property at its severely deteriorated state
because of the city’s actions); Orfield v. Hous. & Redev. Auth. of St. Paul, 305
Minn. 336, 340, 232 N.W.2d 923, 926 (1975) (denying compensation when the city
failed to condemn property when the condemnation proceedings were not the
cause of the deterioration of the property and the city kept the property owner
well-informed that his property may not be taken); Fitger Brewing Co. v. State, 416
N.W.2d 200, 208 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (ruling against the property owner’s claim
for compensation for the closing of the brewery when the brewery owner was able
to sell the land to a developer); Buffalo v. J. W. Clement Co., 269 N.E.2d 895, 900
(N.Y. 1971) (refusing to grant compensation for precondemnation activities when
the property owner planned to relocate to a new facility in a few years).
204. Johnson v. City of Minneapolis, 667 N.W.2d 109, 116 (Minn. 2003).
205. Id.
206. Fitger, 416 N.W.2d at 208.
207. See Johnson, 667 N.W.2d at 116.
208. See id. “In making the judgment, courts will no doubt consider the good
faith of the condemning authority, the circumstances under which various
announcements or communications were made, and the value of giving the
condemnee as much advance notice as possible.” 4-12B JULIUS L. SACKMAN,
NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 12B.17 (revised 3d. ed. 2002).
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V. CONCLUSION
Courts have been reluctant to expand the definition of a
209
taking under the U.S. and Minnesota Constitutions. However, as
demonstrated by Johnson, some situations go too far, requiring the
courts to step in. Johnson serves to warn cities that while they have a
lot of leeway to implement or abandon urban renewal projects,
210
they may not abuse their privilege.
When cities target specific
properties, they have some responsibility to the owners of those
properties to keep them informed such that their properties will
211
not be ruined in the process of condemnation.
Eminent domain proceedings have, some feel, grown out of
212
hand in many respects. This ruling hints at a trend for courts to
213
take a harder line with cities who abuse their privilege. However,
the Minnesota Supreme Court was careful to base its decision solely
on the Minnesota Constitution and to limit its holding to the
214
unique facts.
It is the egregiousness of the facts and ultimate
outcomes for the plaintiffs in each case that seem to drive the
215
individual decisions. Nonetheless, cities beware: Property owners
have rights under the Minnesota Constitution as well.

209. See Kemper, supra note 148, at 127.
210. See Johnson, 667 N.W.2d at 116.
211. See id.
212. Whitehead & Hardin, supra note 147, at 81.
One of the most contentious issues facing local and state governments is
the taking of private property to convey it to another private entity for
the development of a shopping center, baseball park, industrial site, or
some other use deemed advantageous to the well-being of the
community. Often the reason advanced is that the public will benefit
from the proposed taking by an increased tax base or the removal of a
blighted part of town. This is said to be a public use. Sadly, the
definition of public use has grown to include almost any use that meets a
developer’s or local politician’s political and social agenda.
Id.
213. Id. at 102. “Recently, to the astonishment of local governments, courts
are actually questioning the broad definition of public use.” Id. at 81.
214. Johnson, 667 N.W.2d at 116.
215. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss4/2

24

